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EQUAL SACRIFICE AND FAIR BURDEN SHARING 





Applying a willingness to pay approach known from contingent valuation in environmental 
economics, we develop an ordinally based measure for the size of individual sacrifice that is 
connected with an agent's contribution to a public good. We construct a selection mechanism 
that picks the unique efficient solution among all allocations that have an equal sacrifice as 
defined in this way. We show that the solution thus obtained correspond to Moulin’s 
egalitarian equivalent allocation, conforms to both the ability to pay and the benefit 
principles, and has much in common with the Lindahl equilibrium. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the theory of public finance began in the 19
th century, three famous principles of just 
taxation based on different normative ideas have been formulated (see, e.g., Musgrave, 1959, 
for a historical review). The equal sacrifice principle requires that taxation should lead to the 
same (absolute or relative) loss of utility for everyone. In this way, a symmetrical, and thus 
fair, treatment of all citizens is ensured. Taxation according to ability to pay, on the other 
hand, requires that personal tax liability should be positively correlated with the taxpayer's 
income or wealth and thus provides some kind of vertical equity for people with different fi-
nancial capacities. In contrast to both equal sacrifice and ability-to-pay, the benefit principle 
also takes into account how the tax revenue is spent. It postulates that the individual tax bur-
den should be related to the utility gain an agent derives from the governmental expenditures 
that are financed with her taxes. The benefit principle therefore reflects the quid pro quo fair-
ness known from the market exchange of private goods. 
      During the last couple of years, these basic concepts of just taxation have been attracting 
more attention in a field outside the framework of taxation theory in the ordinary sense. So it 
has become a major topic in the political debate and in economic research how to improve the 
supply of "global public goods". Climate protection has now become the most prominent of 
these goods (see, e.g., Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, 1999, Kaul et al., 2003, Sandler, 2004, 
Nordhaus, 2005, Sandmo, 2006, and Kaul and Conceição, 2006). Provision of a public good, 
however, is inefficiently low when agents (or, in the case of an international public good, 
countries) do not cooperate, such that collective actions are required to overcome this under-
provision problem (see, e.g., Sandler, 1992, or Cornes and Sandler, 1996, for a detailed ex-
planation of this standard result in the theory of public goods). 
      In the international sphere cooperation often is, as in the case of the Kyoto protocol in 
climate policy, regulated by a convention which, in particular, stipulates how the contribu-
tions to the global public good are to be distributed among the participating countries (espe-
cially with climate protection see Stern, 2006, pp. 450-467). The venerable principles of just 
taxation become relevant once again for designing the fundamental structure of such burden 
sharing arrangements: Countries will only be ready to accept an agreement when their advan-
tage is in line with their financial obligations, i.e. if the benefit principle is satisfied. At the 
same time, cooperation can only be expected to be successful if no nation feels overburdened 
compared to its partners, and a fair distribution of cooperative efforts is achieved (see Sandler, 
2004, pp. 77-79). This concern for an equitable treatment of all participants is reflected by the 
equal sacrifice principle. In the field of climate change policy there is, moreover, a broad con-  2
sensus that richer countries have a greater obligation to finance greenhouse gas abatement, 
and this could be considered to be an application of the ability-to-pay principle. 
       Despite their importance, and their casual perception in the literature, the principles of 
just taxation as guidelines for fair burden sharing have not been incorporated systematically 
into the theory of public goods. The purpose of this paper is therefore to identify an approach 
where one particular efficient public good allocation that conforms simultaneously to these 
three principles is selected. Taking the equal sacrifice postulate as the starting point, we pro-
ceed as follows: In Section 2, we first describe how the individual sacrifice connected with a 
certain individual public good contribution can be measured by adopting a willingness-to-pay 
technique familiar in environmental economics. (For another application of the willingness to 
pay approach to the standard public good model see Bergstrom, 2006.) With this approach, 
individual contributions to the public good that were originally measured in units of the pri-
vate good are converted into public-goods equivalents so that the public good serves as the 
numéraire. Thus, in contrast to the classical equal sacrifice approach in the theory of taxation, 
a cardinal measure for individual utility is not required. In Section 3, we first establish some 
basic properties of this sacrifice measure that are used throughout the paper. In Section 4, the 
equity norm is then applied to determine the set of public good allocations for which the level 
of this sacrifice is identical for all agents. Imposing allocative efficiency for the public good 
allocation, i.e. the Samuelson rule, as a further normative postulate then gives the desired 
choice mechanism for public-good allocations. In Section 5, it is shown that this mechanism 
corresponds to Moulin´s egalitarian-equivalent solution concept (see Moulin, 1987, 1995). 
Thus an alternative justification for this selection mechanism is provided that is more closely 
related to standard ideas of equal treatment and to the standard concepts of public finance. In 
this way, it also becomes possible to draw a parallel between the egalitarian equivalent solu-
tion in a public goods economy and the classical Lindahl equilibrium which is also done in 
Section 5. In Section 6, we finally show that the equal sacrifice selection rule described in this 
paper also satisfies the benefit principle and the ability-to-pay criterion, so that it, indeed, in-
corporates the three fundamental principles for fair burden sharing. (An empirical account of 
concepts for fair burden sharing in international environmental agreements is given by Lange, 
Vogt and Ziegler, 2007.) 
 
2. Measuring Individual Sacrifice of Public Good Contribution 
We consider a standard public-good economy consisting of n agents  1,..., in =  (see the classi-
cal treatments in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986, and Cornes and Sandler, 1996). Agent i   3








=∑ . The utility function of agent i is ( , ) ii uxG where  i x  is agent  ' i s level of 
private consumption and G  is public-good supply. Each utility function is at least twice con-
tinuously differentiable and strictly monotone increasing in both variables, it is strictly quasi-
concave and both the private and the public good are assumed to be non-inferior. To avoid 
corner solutions we furthermore suppose that in a  i x -G -diagram the indifference curves of 
all agents are tangential to the coordinate axis as, e.g., in the Cobb-Douglas case. Given the 
utility function  ( , ) ii uxG the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and the 















      The public good is produced by a constant returns to scale summation technology. If agent 
i contributes  : ii i gy x =−  to the public good, the total supply of the public good is given by 
 









Among all allocations that meet the budget constraint (1), we want to identify those in which 
the sacrifice for each agent is equal and thus the equal sacrifice principle is satisfied. Apply-
ing this normative concept first of all requires the size of personal sacrifice to be measured in 
an adequate way. In this context, the simplest approach would be to identify agent  ' i s sacri-
fice with the absolute level of her contribution  i g . But such a specification of sacrifice is only 
compatible with ethical intuition when all agents are completely identical, i.e. have the same 
income and the same preferences. Otherwise, one would expect a smaller income, or a lower 
preference for the public good, to increase agent i's subjective burden associated with some 
given contribution level  i g , since this contribution then is harder for her to bear.  
      The problem of finding an adequate measure of subjective individual sacrifice already 
showed up in the classical treatment of equal sacrifice of taxation where sacrifice was related 
to the loss of utility of income and not to income itself. In this approach utility has to be car-
dinally measurable, which is in conflict with the usual assumption of purely ordinal prefer-
ences. (For a modern treatment of the classical equal sacrifice approach see, e.g., Mitra and 
Ok, 1996, or Moyes, 2003). In the present paper, in which the agents´ utility also depends on 
public good consumption, a measure of agent  ' is  personal sacrifice is obtained by construct-  4
ing a public-good equivalent to her contribution  i g . As we take the public good as a 
numéraire, the problem of having to make use of cardinal measurability of utility that was 
pertinent in the classical equal sacrifice approach is avoided.
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Definition 1: Let  1 ( ,..., , ) n A xx G = % %% be some allocation that is feasible according to (1). The 
individual sacrifice  ( )
M
i sA  that agent i makes in the allocation  A is determined by 
 
(2)                                 (, () ) (,)
M
ii i ii uyG s A uxG −= %% % . 
 












By Definition 1, individual public-good contributions  i g  are converted into equivalent public-
good units and thus made comparable. This method for measuring the personal sacrifice is 
analogous to the assessment of individual willingness to pay well-known from contingent 
valuation studies in environmental economics (see e.g. Ebert, 1993, or Kolstad, 2000, pp. 
291-294). So, agent  ' i s sacrifice  ( )
M
i sA  in a given allocation  1 ( ,... , ) n Axx G = % %%  is elicited as 
the answer to a willingness-to-pay question by which agent i is asked how much of the public 
good she would be ready to give up if − starting from her position ( , ) i x G % %  − she could simul-
taneously reduce her public-good contribution to zero. Then agent i becomes indifferent be-
tween her position  ( , ) ii Ax G = % %  attained in A and the position  ( , ( ))
M
ii i B yG s A =− %  where pri-
                                                 
1 See Neill (2000) for an alternative approach to measuring individual sacrifice in a public-goods economy that, 
as in the conventional treatments, refers to differences in cardinal utility. 
Public Good 
i y   i x %   0 
G %  
()
M
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vate consumption is identical with the initially given income  i y  and the public-good supply is 
reduced by the sacrifice level  ()
M
i sA . In an alternative interpretation,  ()
M
i sA  indicates agent 
' i s willingness to pay (in units of the public good) for an increase of private consumption 
from  i x %  to  i y . 
Let – for any utility level  i u  of agent i −  (,)
i
h
ii x u ϕ  denote the inverse Hicksian de-
mand function for the private good which coincides with the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween the private good and the public good 1/ ( , ) ii x G π  when ( , ) i x G  varies along the given 
indifference curve which we will identify with the utility level  i u  throughout the paper. Then 
()
M
i sA  can be represented as an area below the inverse Hicksian demand function, i.e. as  
 









ii i i i i i
i xx
xuxG








where : ii i gy x =− %%  is agent i’s public-good contribution in the allocation A. Thus the sacrifice 
of agent i in allocation A is obtained as this agent’s contribution to the public good, weighted 
by the average marginal rate of substitution measured along the indifference curve   (,) ii uxG % % . 
 
3. Properties of the Sacrifice Measure 
In this section we want to examine how the level of agent i’s sacrifice depends on her position 
(,) ( ,) ii i x Gy g G =− %% %%  attained in a certain allocation A and also on her income  i y  and her pref-
erences ( , ) ii uxG. In the following four steps of the analysis, we will vary only one of the pa-
rameters  i g % ,G %  and  i y  or the utility function  ( , ) ii uxG, while the other three are kept constant. 
Part of the adjustment that is required by the transition from the original allocation A to a new 
feasible allocation called  A′ then has to be made by the other agents. The change of agent i’s 
sacrifice, however, is not affected by the precise nature of the adjustments of the other agents 
so that they do not have to be described explicitly. 
 
(i) If agent i's public good contribution is increased from  i g %  to  i g′ % , her sacrifice obviously 
increases, since the new indifference curve  (,) ii uxG ′ % %  is lower than the original indifference 
curve  (,) ii uxG % % .   6
(ii) If public-good supply grows from G %  to G′ % , the argument is a little more complicated and 
crucially depends on the normality assumption. Letting  :( , ) ii i uu x G = % %%  and  :( , ) ii i uu x G ′ ′ = % %%  we 
consider the two inverse Hicksian demand functions  (,)
h
ii i x u ϕ %  and  (, )
h
ii i x u ϕ ′ %  that correspond 
to these utility levels, respectively. From GG ′ > %% , we have  ii uu ′ > %% , Then normality straight-
forwardly implies that  (,) (,)
hh
ii i ii i x ux u ϕϕ ′ ≥ %%  holds for all  i x , so that the indifference curve 
through ( , ) i x G′ % %  is, for any  i x , steeper than that through ( , ) i x G % %  (see Appendix A1 for details). 
Using our representation formula (3), this allows a comparison of the new sacrifice  ( )
M
i sA ′  
(with the new position (, ) i x G′ % %  of agent i) and the original sacrifice level  ()
M
i sA  
 





i i ii i i ii i i
xx




(iii) If the income of agent i is increased from  i y  to  i y′ the effect on the sacrifice level again 
rests upon normality. Letting now  : ( , ) ii i i uu y g G ′′ =− % %% , we consider the inverse Hicksian de-
mand function  ( , )
h
ii i x u ϕ ′ % . If a horizontal translation by  : ii tyy ′ = −  is made, normality implies 
(, ) ( ,)
hh
ii i ii i x ux t u ϕϕ ′ ≤− %% , i.e. moving to the right makes the indifference curves flatter (see 
again Appendix A1). Denoting  iii x yg ′′ =− %% , we then get the following estimate:  
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This means that agent i's sacrifice becomes smaller if her income increases. 
 
(iv) Finally, we suppose that agent i is substituted by another type of agent with a utility 
function ( , ) ii uxG ′  which represents a weaker preference for the public good than the original 
utility function  ( , ) ii uxG. This intensification of preferences for the public good is described 
by the assumption that the new utility function everywhere exhibits a higher marginal will-
ingness to pay for the public good, i.e. that 
   7
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holds for all consumption bundles ( , ) i x G . This condition means that the indifference curve 
:( , ) ii i uu x G ′′ = % %%  is flatter in the  point ( , ) i x G % %  than the original indifference curve  (,) ii i uu x G = % %% . 
The two indifference curves  i u %  and  i u′ %  cannot cross twice because this would violate assump-
tion (6). So, the indifference curve  i u′ %  must lie above the indifference curve  i u %  right to  i x %  
which clearly implies that agent i´s sacrifice is reduced.  
       
We summarize these findings as follows: 
 
Proposition 1:  The individual sacrifice of an agent becomes higher if 
(i)  the public-good contribution, or 
(ii)  total public-good supply increases.  
The individual sacrifice of an agent is lower if 
(iii)  her income increases, or  
(iv)  her preferences for the public good become stronger. 
 
 
4. Equal Sacrifice Allocations 
Having developed a concept for the measurement of sacrifice it is now straightforward to 
characterize equal sacrifice allocations. This is made precise by the next definition. 
 
Definition 2: Let an income distribution  1 ( ,..., ) n yy  and preferences  1 ( ,..., ) n uu  be given. A 
feasible allocation  1 ( ,..., , ) n A xx G = % %% is called an equal sacrifice allocation when there is some 
sacrifice level  0 s >  such that 
 
(7)                                 ( )
M
i sAs =                       for all  1,..., in = . 
 
In order to show that such equal sacrifice solutions exist, we use the following construction in 
which we start with some public good level  ]0, ] GY ∈ . We then define for any sacrifice level 
[0, [ sG ∈  a private consumption level  ( , ) i x sG (  of agent i by letting   8
 
(8)                                   ( ( , ), ) ( , ) ii ii uxs GG uyG s = − ( . 
 
Thus, as depicted in Figure 2,  ( , ) i x sG (  is agent i´s private consumption level when public-













Given our assumption that all indifference curves are tangential to the G axis, a unique pri-
vate-good consumption level  ( , ) i x sG (  exists for all  ]0, ] GY ∈  and all  [0, [ sG ∈ . Obviously, 




= (  
holds for any agent  1,..., in = . Moreover, for a fixed sacrifice level s, ( , ) i x sG (  is increasing 
in G , since it follows from parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 that otherwise the sacrifice level 
would increase. 
         Having established these properties of the function  ( , ) i x sG (  we now consider the func-
tion 
 
(9)                
1









The function  (, ) HsG defined by (8) describes how much aggregate income would be re-
quired if public-good supply were G and all agents  1,..., in =  had the equal sacrifice level s. 
The function  (, ) HsG is differentiable in both variables and strictly decreasing in s, and from 
Public Good 
s 
i y   (, ) i x sG (   0 
G  
Private Good
Figure 2   9
the properties of the functions  ( , ) i x sG ( , it follows that  (0, ) HGY G Y =+> and 




=<. Thus, by continuity and monotonicity of  ( , ) HsG in G, the mean-value 
theorem implies, that there is a unique value of sacrifice  ( )
M sG  such that 
 
(10)                        ( ( ), )
M Hs GG Y = . 
 
Hence, there exists a unique equal sacrifice allocation   1 ( ( ( ), ),..., ( ( ), ), )
MM
n x sG G x sG G G ( (  
that fulfils the budget constraint (1) with the public good supply G. 
        By equation (10), the function  ( )
M sG  is implicitly defined for all public good levels in 
]0, [ Y , and, since 
0










= , this function takes on any value in this 
interval. Furthermore, from totally differentiating equation (9) we obtain 
 











This inequality follows from  /0 Hs ∂∂ <  and  /0 HG ∂ ∂>, which holds, since each  ( , ) i x sG (  is 
decreasing in s and increasing in G. As the function  ( )
M sG  is thus strictly increasing, it can 
be inverted. The inverse function of  ( )
M sG , which is called  ( )
M Gs , then is defined on ]0, [ Y  
and it is strictly increasing, too. This yields the following result. 
 
Proposition 2: For each  ]0, [ sY ∈  there is a unique feasible allocation in which all agents 
have the equal individual sacrifice s. 
 
Proof: Given s, let public-good supply be  ( )
M Gs  and private consumption of agent i be 
() : (, () )
MM
ii x sx s G s = ( . Then, by the construction above,  1 ( ( ),..., ( ), ( ))
MM M
n x sx s G s  is a feasi-
ble allocation in which all agents have the same sacrifice level s. As  ( )
M Gs  is a strictly in-
creasing function, the sacrifice level must be different from s in any other feasible equal sac-
rifice allocation which shows uniqueness. 
QED. 
   10
5. The Choice Mechanism 
Through Proposition 1 it becomes clear that there are infinitely many equal sacrifice solutions 
that could, depending on the sacrifice level s, be described by an "equal-sacrifice curve" 
1 ( ( ),..., ( ), ( ))
MM M
n x sx s G s  in the 
1 n+   -space. (See, e.g., Schlesinger and Sullivan, 1986, for a 
similar construction in the Kolm-triangle for the two-person case.) We now want to show that 
on this curve there is one single point that gives a Pareto-optimal allocation.  
       For a proof, consider the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the 
private good along the equal sacrifice curve, i.e. we denote  () : ( () , () )
MM M
ii i sx s G s ππ =  for 
each agent  1 i = ,…,n and each sacrifice level  ]0, [ sY ∈ . From the supposed tangency proper-
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∏= ∞  
so that there is some 
* ]0, [ sY ∈  for which 
* ()1
M s ∏ = . The feasible equal sacrifice allocation 
** *
1 ( ( ),..., ( ), ( ))
MM M
n x sx s G s  then fulfils the Samuelson condition and thus is Pareto-optimal.  
         In order to show that 
** *
1 ( ( ),..., ( ), ( ))
MM M
n x sx s G s  is the unique efficient allocation in 
the economy under consideration we need a separate argument. For that, we first note that in 
an equal sacrifice allocation the utility levels different agents attain can never move in an op-
posite direction when the sacrifice level s is changed. This is obvious since − according to 
equations (2) and (7) and the definition of  ( )
M Gs  − the utility of each agent must change in 
the same direction as  ( )
M Gss − . 
       Now suppose that there are two different sacrifice levels 
* s  and 
** s  for which 
** * () ( ) 1
MM ss ∏= ∏ =  holds such that two Pareto-optimal allocations would exist. It is a di-
rect consequence of our observation concerning the parallel change of all agent’s utilities that 
in this case 
** * ** * ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ))
MM M M
ii ii ux s G s ux s G s =  for all  1,..., in = , i.e. all agents have 
the same utility in both equal sacrifice solutions. Otherwise, a contradiction with the supposed 
Pareto optimality of the two equal sacrifice allocations would result. 
     Without loss of generality, 
** * ss >  may be assumed so that, from strict monotonicity of 
the function  ( )
M Gs , we get 
** * () ( )
MM Gs Gs > . Having the same utility levels in both alloca-
tions thus requires 
** * () ( )
MM
ii x sx s <  for all agents  1,..., in = . From the assumed normality of   11
preferences we then get 
** ** ** * * * ( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )) ( )
MM M M M M
ii i i i i sx s G s x s G s s ππ π π =< =  for 
all agents  1,..., . in =  This gives 
** ** * *
11







=∏ = < =∏ = ∑∑  which is 
a contradiction. So we can conclude: 
 
Proposition 3: There is a unique sacrifice level 
* s  such that the equal sacrifice allocation 
** *
1 ( ( ),..., ( ), ( ))
MM M
n x sx s G s  is Pareto optimal. 
 
Using Proposition 3, the mechanism that picks an equal sacrifice solution is now character-
ized as follows:  
 
Definition 3: Let a public goods economy be given by the income distribution ( 1,..., n yy ) and 
preferences ( 1,..., n uu ). Then the equal sacrifice solution for this public goods economy is 
defined as  11 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ,..., , ) ( ( ),..., ( ), ( ))
MM M M M M M M M
nn xx G x s x s G s =  where the sacrifice level 
* ˆ :
M ss =  is determined according to Proposition 3.  
 
Given normality, the equal sacrifice solution as characterized by Definition 3 is well-defined 
and unique. 
 
5. Comparison with the Literature 
It is now straightforward that the equal sacrifice solution according to Definition 3 coincides 
with the egalitarian-equivalent allocation of the given economy (see Moulin, 1987, 1995). 
Given an income distribution  1 ( ,..., ) n yy  and preferences  1 ( ,..., ) n uu  define  ˆ ˆ :
M MM GG s =− . 
From condition (2) we then have  
 
(13)   ˆ ˆ (, ) ( , )
M MM
ii ii ux G uyG =   
 
so that 
M G  is the egalitarian-equivalent public-good supply in the sense of Moulin. Using a 
line of the argument different from that of Moulin, we have thus been able to link the egalitar-
ian equivalent solution concept to the equal sacrifice principle. (For justifications of the 
Moulin solution see − besides Moulin, 1987, himself − Maniquet and Sprumont, 2004.)   12
      In this way, it becomes also possible to compare Moulin´s approach with the much older 
Lindahl solution. To this end, we define − quite analogous to (2) – for any given feasible al-
location  1 ( ,..., , ) n A xx G = % %%, an alternative Lindahl-sacrifice by letting 
 













where  ii i gy x =− %%  again denotes agent i´s contribution to the public good in A. 
         The sacrifice level according to (14) is measured by using the marginal valuation of the 
private good in units of the public good in position ( , ) i x G % %  instead of the total willingness to 
pay (see, e.g. Ebert, 2003, and Ebert and Tillmann, 2006, for a general discussion of the mar-
ginal valuation approach in a public goods economy). This Lindalian measurement device is 












It is obvious from Figure 3 that with strictly convex indifference curves  () ()
LM
ii sA s A >  is 
automatically implied, i.e. the level of the Lindahl sacrifice always exceeds the level of the 
sacrifice expounded in this paper. 
       It again follows from normality that the Lindahl sacrifice has the same properties as 
stated in Proposition 1. We can also identify equal sacrifice allocations that are based on the 
Lindahlian sacrifice concept. The corresponding choice mechanism then picks an allocation 
1 ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., , )
LL
n x xG  that implies an equal Lindahl sacrifice for all agents and, as well, is efficient. It 
has been shown in Buchholz and Peters (2007) that the Lindahlian equal sacrifice allocation 
1 ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., , )
L LL





i sA  
()
M
i sA  
i u %  
Private Good  i y   i x %   0 
G %  
i A  13
agents 1,..., in =  acted as price-takers and agent i was confronted with the personalized Lin-
dahl price  ˆ ˆˆ :( , )
L L
ii i p xG π = . (For other distributional features of the Lindahl solution see 
Buchholz, Cornes and Peters, 2006.) 
Even though the sacrifice measures 
M
i s  and 
L
i s  are conceptually different, they may 
yield the same efficient equal sacrifice solutions under specific circumstances. This is, e.g., 
the case if all agents have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences. Then, application of both 
equal sacrifice concepts implies that, in the corresponding equal sacrifice solutions, the pub-
lic-good contributions of all agents  1,..., in =  are proportional to their income levels  i y  (see 
the Appendix A2 for a detailed analysis of the Cobb-Douglas case).  
 
6. Properties of the Equal Sacrifice Solutions 
In this Section we show that the equal sacrifice solution as characterized in this paper satisfies 
both the ability-to-pay principle and the benefit principle. (Concerning the empirical rele-
vance of the two principles in the case of global public goods, see Barrett, 2006, pp. 365-366.) 
To make this precise we first have to define exactly what these principles are to mean. 
Concerning ability to pay, we assume that two agents  j  and k  have the same utility 
function but differ with respect to their income, so that, without loss of generality,  kj yy >  
holds. If some arbitrary choice mechanism E  picks an allocation  1 ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., , )
E EE
n x xG  with indi-
vidual public-good contributions  ˆˆ :
E E
ii i gy x = − , this mechanism is said to satisfy the (weak) 
ability to pay principle if  ˆˆ E E
kj gg ≥  holds, i.e. if the richer agent k  does not  make a smaller 
contribution to the public good than the poorer agent  j  does. 
Analogously, the (weak) benefit principle requires that, given the same income level, 
an agent with a stronger preference for the public good, as defined by reference to marginal 
willingness to pay in condition (6), should not make a smaller contribution to the public good 
than an agent with a weaker preference (see Hines, 2000, for a general discussion of the bene-
fit principle). If this condition is met and if, additionally,  jk yy =  holds, the benefit principle 
is satisfied for a mechanism E  if and only if  ˆˆ E E
kj gg ≥ . (For a general discussion of the bene-
fit principle see Hines, 2000.) 
It is now a straightforward consequence of Proposition 1 that both principles are satis-
fied for equal sacrifice solutions. Assume that the public-good contribution of agent k would 
be smaller than that of agent j if the income of agent k were higher than that of agent j, or   14
agent k's preferences for the public good were stronger than that of agent j. Combining the 
results of Proposition 1 (i) with those in Proposition 1 (iii) or (iv), respectively, this implies 
that agent k would have to bear a smaller sacrifice than agent j which contradicts the equal 
sacrifice assumption.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has shown how, in a standard public goods economy, the venerable equal sacrifice 
principle can be applied to make a selection among efficient allocations. Unlike the traditional 
literature, however, we did not make use of losses in cardinally measurable utility as an indi-
cator of individual sacrifice. Instead we obtained a sacrifice measure by transforming the in-
dividual expenses for the public good into public-good equivalents. The method by which this 
transformation was made was borrowed from the willingness-to-pay assessment well known 
from the contingent valuation techniques used in environmental economics. The public-good 
allocations, that show an equal sacrifice defined in this way and are also Pareto optimal, turn 
out to be identical with the egalitarian equivalent solutions as conceived by Moulin (1987). 
Moreover, they satisfy the ability-to-pay and the benefit principles properly defined.  
      The novel justification of the egalitarian equivalent solution concept provided in this pa-
per also makes it possible to recognize its similarity with the classical Lindahl equilibrium, 
since the Lindahl mechanism can also be put down to the equal sacrifice principle. The differ-
ence, however, is that assessment of the sacrifice as made in our approach is based on total 
willingness-to-pay or, in an alternative interpretation, average valuation of the public good, 
whereas the Lindahl solution rests upon the valuation of the public-goods contribution accord-
ing to marginal willingness-to-pay. In special cases both equal sacrifice solutions may coin-
cide but generally they will be different. 
     Measuring individual sacrifice by total valuations as in the present paper, takes into ac-
count more information about individual preferences than the Lindahl approach in which as-
sessment of sacrifice is only based on marginal willingness-to-pay at a single point. In a world 
of full information, as assumed here (and also in the standard treatments of the Lindahl and 
the egalitarian equivalent solution concepts), the solution described in this paper is therefore 
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i u′ 
Appendix A1: Steepness of Indifference Curves 
Consider agent i and fix some level  i x  of her private consumption. Let, as in the main text, 
i u′ and  i u′′  be two utility levels of agent i with  ii uu ′′′ > . By G′ and G′′ we then denote the 
levels of public-good supply for which  (, ) ii i uxG u ′ ′ =  and  (, ) ii i uxG u ′ ′′ ′′ =  holds. Now assume 
:( , ) ( , ) :
hh
ii i i i i i i p xu xu p ϕϕ ′′ ′′ ′ ′ =<= , i.e. that the indifference curve  i u′′ at ( , ) i x G′′  is flatter than 
the indifference curve  i u′ at ( , ) i x G′ . Thus, as depicted in Figure 5, agent i endowed with the 
income : ii i yx p G ′′ ′ ′′ =+  and confronted with the public-good price  i p′ would demand less of 














Since  i x  is agent i´s private good demand, given the income  iii yxp G ′ ′′ = +  and the public 
good price  i p′, and clearly  ii yy ′′ ′ <  holds, this would contradict the assumption that the private 
good is normal.  
     Since indifference curves are convex it is a straightforward implication of this argument 
that indifference curves become steeper if public good consumption grows and private good 
consumption falls simultaneously.  
 
A2: The Equal Sacrifice Solution in the Cobb-Douglas Case 
Let n agents  1,..., in =  be given by their income levels  1,..., n yy  and their Cobb-Douglas util-
ity functions  ( , )
i
ii i uxG x G
ρ = . In the equal sacrifice solution  1 ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., , )
MM M
n xx G  the common 
equal sacrifice level  ˆ
M s  must satisfy  ˆˆ ˆˆ () ( )
ii MM M M
ii xG y G s
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which yields 








ρ =−  for the common sacrifice level. For individual private con-
sumption, we obtain  ˆ
i M
ii x Ay









= <  is a constant for the given public-
goods economy. The individual public-good contributions then are  ˆ (1 )
i M
ii gA y
ρ =− .  
        This expression clearly confirms the results of Proposition 4 in the main text for the 
Cobb-Douglas case. If two agents j and k have the same preferences, i.e.  jk ρ ρ =  holds, but 
kj yy > , then  ˆˆ
M M
kj gg >  so that the agent with the higher income makes a higher contribution 
to the public good and ability to pay is fulfilled. If, on the other hand, two agents  j  and k  
have the same income  jk yy =  but  kj ρ ρ > , we have again  ˆˆ
M M
kj gg > , i.e. the agent with the 
stronger preference for the public good makes a higher contribution, which gives the benefit 
principle. 
         We  now  compare  our  equal  sacrifice  solution  with  the  Lindahl  equilibrium 
( 1 ˆ ˆˆ ,..., ,
L LL











 for agents  1,..., in = . When all agents have the same preferences, so that 
i ρ ρ =  for  1,..., in = , it directly follows from our formulas that public-good contributions 
must be proportional to the individual income level in both solutions. Since efficiency of both 














=∑  is total income, both equal sacrifice 
solutions coincide when all agents have the same Cobb-Douglas preferences. 
  However, when agents have different Cobb-Douglas preferences, the equal sacrifice 
solution  1 ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., , )
M MM
n x xG may differ from  1 ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., , )
LL L
n x xG . This is demonstrated by the follow-
ing simple example: Let  2 n = ,  12 1 yy = =  and  1 1 ρ =  and  2 2 ρ = . Then clearly  1
1 ˆ
2




L x = ,  1
1 ˆ
2
L g = ,  2
1 ˆ
3
L g =  and 
7 ˆ 1,17
6
L G == . The utility levels of the two agents are 
1 ˆ 0.58
L u =  and  1 ˆ 0.45
L u = . On the other hand, 
2
21 ˆˆ ()
MM xx =  which – combined with the feasibil-
ity condition and the Samuelson rule for efficiency – leads to the quadratic equation 
2
11 ˆ 3( ) 2 2 0
MM xx +− = . Solving this equation for  1 ˆ
M x  yields  1 ˆ = 0.55
M x , which then implies 
2 ˆ 0.3
M x = ,  1 ˆ 0.45
M g = ,  2 ˆ 0.7
M g =  and thus  ˆ 1.15
M G = . This shows that both solutions need not   17
be identical. For the utility levels we obtain  1 ˆ 0.63
M u =  and  2 ˆ 0.4
M u =  so that agent 1 with the 
lower preference for the public good is worse off in the Lindahl solution where for agent 2 the 
reverse result holds. 
      In the general case with non-homogenous Cobb-Douglas preferences an explicit compari-
son between the two solutions is difficult to make since no closed form expression for the 
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